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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(a), 
has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1• Whether the Court errored by according greater weight to 
Defendants/Respondents affidavits than Plaintiffs/Appellants 
affidavit when inference indulges that when considering motions 
for summary judgment it is not appropriate for the Court to weigh 
the evidence or assess credibility, W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Natural Resources Co-, 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
2. Whether the Court errored by failing to review, " . . . 
inferences to be drawn from the facts . . . in a light most 
favorable to the Appellants. Webster v. Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170, 
1172 (Utah 1983) thereby ruling that Plaintiffs/Appellants did 
not established the requisite causal link between the treatment, 
or lack of, provided by Defendants'/Respondents' to cause the 
death of the minor child. Godeskv v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 
541 (Utah 1984) 
3. Did the Court of Appeals improperly rule on the lack of 
proximate cause when the lower court ruled on the issue of 
proximate causation only from the perspective that intervening 
events occurred superceding any misconduct on the part of the 
defendants? Watters v. Querrv, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978). 
The standard of review for this case is whether the court of 
Appeals abused its discretion. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants filed a wrongful death complaint against 
respondents Dr. Nickol, Dr. Okubo and Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital alleging improper and negligent treatment, which 
resulted in their infant child's death. 
Respondents moved for summary judgment at the District Court 
level and were granted summary judgment by an order dated, 
January 27th, 1988. (See Addendum A). Appellants appealed the 
order granting summary judgment dismissing their action for 
wrongful death (medical malpractice) and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court judgment on March 28th, 1990 because of 
the lack of evidence. (See Addendum B). 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' infant child, Tiffany, was born on June 30, 
1984. 
2. Tiffany was taken to Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
four days after her birth. Two subsequent visits to Holy Cross 
Jordan Valley Hospital occurred on July 16th, 1984 and August 
16th, 1984 after she stopped breathing and was treated each time 
by Dr. Nickol. 
3. Tiffany died December 20th, 1984 of sudden infant death 
syndrome (SIDS). 
4. Tiffany was also treated by Dr. Okubo on July 16th, 
1984. 
5. Dr. Nickol failed to properly refer the child to a 
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proper physician for issuance of a home apnea monitor or to 
recommend its use, which could have prevented the infant child's 
death. 
6, Dr. Okubo, likewise, failed to properly order the 
appropriate treatment of the monitor, (See ADDENDUM D). 
7. Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital employees failed to 
properly record the previous visits and records and the symptoms 
observed as well as to report these material facts to the 
physicians. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Whether the Court of Appeals errored by according less 
weight to Appellants affidavit. All affidavits were sufficient 
in form and substance; there was not reason whatsoever to have 
accorded greater weight to Respondents affidavits than the one 
presented by the Appellants. By according greater weight to 
Respondents affidavits, the Court weighed the evidence and 
assessed credibility, rather than solely determine if there 
existed a genuine issue of material fact which could be submitted 
to the trier of fact thereby concluding that Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit was sufficient to defeat Respondents motions for 
summary judgment. 
The Court errored by not reviewing all affidavits in light 
most favorable to the Appellants' because inference indulges that 
greater weight should be accorded Appellants affidavit when 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' supporting 
affidavit clearly indicated that the issue of proximate cause was 
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sufficiently presented to create doubt as to Defendants duty to 
follow the appropriate standard of care. Dr. Jacobs' testifies 
directly on the issue of proximate cause. He also indicated how 
the hospital failed to make proper records available to detail 
previous hospital visits for Respondent physicians review. Had 
the Court view the Appellants' affidavit most favorable to them, 
it could have reasonably concluded that a genuine issue of 
material existed; and, his expert opinion was sufficient to 
create doubt thereby raising a genuine issue in regard to 
proximate cause. 
It was error to have ruled that intervening events occurred 
superceding any misconduct on the part of the Respondents because 
no assertions of intervening events occurring, which disturbed 
the causal nexus described by Dr. Jacobs, were submitted by 
Respondents. Respondents failed to act in accordance to the 
appropriate standard of care by not admitting Tiffany to in-
hospital observation or ordering the use of the home monitor. 
Therefore, their original omitted acts does not relieve them from 
liability. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
I. WHETHER RESPONDENTS AFFIDAVIT WAS ACCORDED GREATER 
WEIGHT THAN APPELLANTS 
Dr. Obuko has previously asserted that Dr. Jacobs' affidavit 
"makes only a conclusory allegation of proximate causation 
without specific facts or competent proof." Dr. Nickol also 
makes such an assertion. However, Okubo and Nickol error because 
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Dr. Jacobs' affidavit is sufficient, in form and substance, to 
raise a genuine issue of fact, precluding summary judgment, as 
discussed herein. 
In considering a motion for summary judgment, "it is not 
appropriate for a court to weigh the evidence or assess 
credibility; the sole initial inquiry is whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact. W.M» Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981). Furthermore, it 
takes only one sworn statement to dispute the averments on the 
other side of the controversy and create an issue for the trial 
of fact to consider. Id.; Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. Clark, 755 
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988)." (Quoting Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical. Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988). 
Okubo has confused the requirements of affidavits for those 
of lay persons with those of experts. He cites as controlling 
authority the rule, "[t]o raise a genuine issue of fact, an 
affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant's opinions and 
conclusions." Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 
2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973); (quoting) Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 
1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). In addition, "Rule 56(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that affidavits in support of 
or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must set forth 
such facts as would be admissable in evidence at trial." Norton 
v. Blackman, 669 P.2d 857 (1983); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen 
Bros Const., 731 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1986). Appellants concede 
that "an identical requirement is found in almost all 
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jurisdictions." The standard Okubo relied on is appropriate for 
lay experts. However, Dr. Jacobs is testifying as an expert 
witness. Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence (URE), is the 
applicable standard of review for affidavits submitted under Rule 
56(e) (URCP), which provides: 
"Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill/ experience 
and training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion." (Emphasis added). 
Because Dr. Jacobs' is testifying as an expert, Appellants assert 
that American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah 
1988), states the proper rule and is determinative in resolving 
this issue. 
To start, Respondent expert, Dr. Neilsen, in his affidavit 
states, "although some physicians may choose to order a home 
monitor for circumstances similar to what the plaintiffs reported 
occurred on July 4, 1984, the standard of care would clearly not 
have required Dr. Okubo to order one or refer the patient to 
another physician who would do so." (ADDENDUM C). This expert 
opinion was directly controverted by a sworn evidentiary 
document, more specifically, Dr. Jacobs' affidavit. 
In it, he states, while one could perhaps argue that such 
care was not warranted following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, X 
am of the opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 
pediatric check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency 
room visits. Drs. Okubo and Nichols had a duty to insure 
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necessary follow-up was carried out and failed to do so. The 
above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an accepted standard 
(negligence) and was the proximate cause of the child's demise 
from SIPS." (ADDENDUM D) . (Emphasis added). He testifies 
directly on the issue of causation. Consequently, greater weight 
should not have been accorded to Dr. Neilsen's or Dr. Pinell's 
affidavit than Dr. Jacobs' because all medical doctors were 
detennined to have the competence to form an opinion with respect 
to the standard of care, or lack of care. As stated in W.M. 
Barnes Co., it is not appropriate for a court to weigh the 
evidence or assess the credibility. The fact is, Dr. Neilsen's 
affidavit is conclusory. 
Dr. Neilsen states, "in addition, even if Dr. Okubo had 
ordered a home monitor there is insufficient data or literature 
available to conclude with medical probability that it would have 
prevented this particular infant's death." In other words, there 
exists insufficient data or literature to conclude with medical 
certainty that it would not have prevented Tiffany's death. 
Because medical probability is quite different than a legal 
standard of proof and the affiant does not define exactly what 
that standard is, it is not very helpful in determining causation 
in the instant case. In this case, "a genuine issue of material 
fact exists [because] on the basis of the facts in the record, 
reasonable minds [Dr. Okubo, Dr. Neilsen and Dr. Jacobs] differ 
on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the standard." 
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967): FMA 
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Acceptance Co. V. Leatherbv Insurance Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 
(1979). 
All physicians were deemed competent, and "may testify 
thereto in the form of opinion[s]M, Rule 702 (URE). Because 
there exists a sworn evidentiary document, "to dispute the 
averments on the other side of the controversy," Lucky Seven 
Rodeo Corp., supra, there exists a dispute of material fact as to 
who may be responsible for Tiffany's death. Because both Courts 
weighed the evidence and assessed the credibility of all medical 
doctors, the lower Courts errored by according greater weight to 
Respondents affidavits rather than reviewing the affidavits in 
the light most favorable to Appellants. If looked at in the 
light most favorable to Appellants, it is clear that Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact to be determined by the trier of fact. American Concept 
Ins. Co.i supra. Thus, Respondents' motion for summary should be 
reversed because, "a motion for summary judgment should be denied 
where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact 
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle 
him to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ. P. 56(c); 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp,, 29 Utah 184, 506 P.2d 1274 
(1973); University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 
504 P.2d 29 (1972). 
POINT II 
II. PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY APPELLANTS 
The Court of Appeals found that Plaintiffs' did not 
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establish the requisite causal link between the Defendants' 
treatment and the infant child's death, (See Addendum A, pp. 6 
and 7). However, Plaintiffs' supporting affidavit clearly 
indicated that the issue of proximate cause was sufficiently 
presented by Dr. Jacobs to call into doubt Defendants' failure to 
follow the standard of care, resulting in the death of the 
parties minor child. "The above, in my opinion, constitutes care 
below an accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate 
cause of the child's demise from SIDS." (Addendum D para. 13). 
M[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissable in not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.", Rule 704 URE; and, 
"whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care 
is a question of fact for the jury. Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 
404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962); FMA Acceptance Co., supra; Jackson v. 
Dabney 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). Because Dr. Jacobs is a 
competent expert witness, and his testimony would be admitted at 
trial, pursuant to Rule 702 (URE), his expert opinion was 
sufficient to establish proximate cause. 
Dr. Jacobs also set forth how the hospital failed to 
properly make records available to detail previous hospital 
visits and how the two Respondent physicians should have required 
the deceased to have been observed in the hospital and required 
the use of a home apnea monitor. (See ADDENDUM D). Thus, the 
proper legal cause of the demise of the infant was sufficiently 
presented when looked at in the light most favorable to 
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Appellant. 
Dr. Jacobs further specifies that the hospital nursing staff 
and Dr. Nickol failed to detail the fact that actual apnea was 
observed by the parents and that there was cyanosis. Also 
omitted was the fact that the child required stimulation such as 
pinching or significant findings on exam to account for 
respiratory compromise. Factors such as inaccurate record 
keeping by the hospital, an improper history taken by the staff, 
as well as the unavailability of records during subsequent visits 
to the hospital contributed directly to the failure to consider 
SIDS susceptibility in the infant, which would have resulted in 
the ordering of the home apnea monitor. Dr. Jacobs testifies 
that these material facts fell below the standard of care and 
were directly attributable to the child's demise. (See ADDENDUM 
D). 
Further, he explains that Dr. Okubo should have issued a 
home apnea monitor after the 7-16-84 pediatric check-up and Dr. 
Nickol should have arranged for a home apnea monitor. Tiffany's 
death, he states, would easily have been avoided if this 
treatment would have been carried out, and the Respondents failed 
in their duty to do so. He then states that the Respondents' 
above described negligence was the proximate cause of the child's 
demise from SIDS. (See Aff. of Dr. Jacob's paras. 9-13). 
The general rule regarding proximate cause is: 
"A proximate cause of an injury is a cause which 
in direct unbroken sequence produces the injury. It is 
one without which the injury would not have occurred. 
The law does not necessarily recognize only one 
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proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only one 
actor, one act, or the conduct of only one person. To 
the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more 
persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of 
an injury, and in such a case, each of the 
participating act or omissions is regarded in law as a 
proximate cause and both may be held responsible." 
(Empha sis added). 
Godeskv v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541, 545-546 (Utah 1984). 
Therefore, Appellants did establish the requisite sufficient 
enough to demonstrate proximate cause and have the issue 
submitted to a trier of fact. 
POINT III 
III WHETHER THE LOWER COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED ON THE LACK OF 
PROXIMATE CAUSE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE THAT INTERVENING 
EVENTS OCCURRED SUPERCEDING ANY MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF 
RESPONDENTS 
Okubo asserts, "defendant physician could not foresee the 
negligence of the other physicians who subsequently treat the 
plaintiff." Apparently, this is offered as an intervening 
factor. Okubo reasons, "[i]n a medical malpractice action where 
there are a number of possible cause for the plaintiff's injury, 
a physician's negligence will be regarded as a proximate cause 
only if the evidence is more likely or probable that his 
negligence caused injury than the other possible causes. 
(Emphasis added). In Utah: 
"Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable 
man [Okubo] and prudent person would have done under 
the circumstances, or doing what such a person under 
such circumstances would not have done. The fault may 
be in acting or omitting to act [failure to recommend 
in-hospital observation and failure to issue a home 
apnea monitor]." (Emphasis added). 
Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981). 
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Additionally, "proximate causation is generally a matter of fact 
to be determined by the jury. Godeskv, supra. 
Okubo argues that Okubo could not have foreseen that Tiffany 
would go to another physician whose negligence acts cause her 
death. The Trial Court in granting summary judgment for 
Respondents ruled that the Respondents were not a proximate cause 
of the infant's death inasmuch as there were intervening events 
that superceded any misconduct on the part of the said 
defendants. (Addendum A, p. 2). As stated previously: 
"The law does not necessarily recognize only one 
proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only one 
actor, one act, or the conduct of only one person. To 
the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more 
persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of 
an injury, and in such a case, each of the 
participating act or omissions is regarded in law as a 
proximate cause and both may be held responsible." 
(Empha sis added). 
Godesky, supra. 
The motions for summary judgment do not specify any 
factual elements of any intervening events and there is nothing 
in the record to give Plaintiffs cause to rebut any assertion of 
superceding causes. Nothing in Respondents responsive pleadings 
or their affidavits suggest intervening events superceded any 
misconduct, other than that attributed to the parents' 
negligence, which was asserted in Respondents' answers, as being 
greater than or equal to the negligence of defendants. No 
factual allegations were spelled out on the record to establish 
an intervening and superseding cause, and no evidentiary hearings 
were held before the court. Rather, when asked at a deposition 
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if he knew of any negligence that may have occurred because of 
the Butterfield parents' conduct, Dr. Nickol replied, "I would 
say, no." (Nickol depo. p. 48). 
The record is devoid of any misconduct on Appellants' part 
and no assertions were made during oral argument at the Trial 
Court that any superceding causes existed. Nevertheless: 
"An intervening negligent act does not 
automatically become a superseding cause that relieves 
the original actor. The earlier actor is charged with 
the foreseeable negligent act of others. Therefore, if 
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier 
negligent act is a concurring cause. '[T]his includes 
situations where negligent of other wrongful conduct of 
others should be reasonably anticipated.' Watters v. 
Ouerry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702, 704 (1978) (Watters I). 
See also Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d at 
219 ("[a] person's negligence is not superseded by the 
negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of 
another is foreseeable"); Prosser, Law of Torts 275 
(4th ed. 1971) ." 
Godeskv, supra, at 545. Concurring negligent causes of death are 
questions to be determined by the trier of fact. 
For the Trial Court to have ruled that intervening events 
occurred without that issue being placed before him by 
evidentiary documentation was error and to have done so without 
allowing rebuttal shifted the burden of proof and denied 
Plaintiff's due process. No assertions of intervening events 
occurring which disturbed the causal nexus described by Dr. 
Jacobs were submitted by Respondents. So, "[u]nless the evidence 
is free from doubt so that all reasonable men would come to the 
same conclusion, negligence is a question of fact to be decided 
by the jury. Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112 
(Utah 1982). Also, "where doubt exists, a party should go to 
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trial." Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 1983). 
It should be noted that the only prerequisite needed to 
reverse the trial court in Reeves, supra, was a sworn evidentiary 
statement attributing the proximate cause of the harm complained 
of to Defendants' negligence. Dr. Jacobs sworn affidavit exists 
to controvert Respondents medical experts opinions and attribute 
the proximate cause directly to Respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
A close look at the supporting affidavit clearly indicates 
that the issue of proximate cause was sufficiently presented by 
Dr. Jacobs to indicate that Respondents failure to follow the 
standard of care resulted in the death of the parties minor 
child. Respondents' affidavits should not have been given more 
credibility when assessing the standard of care. Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit clearly controverts Respondents'. He clearly set forth 
how the hospital had failed to properly make records available to 
detail previous hospital visits and how the two respondent 
physicians should have required the deceased to have been 
observed in the hospital and required the use of a home apnea 
monitor. Thereforef the proper legal cause of the demise of the 
infant was presented when looked at in the light most favorable 
to Appellants and each of the Respondents should answer to the 
trier of fact. 
vi ^ 
Dated this <^J day of November, 1990. 
David Grindstaff 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
••—oooOooo—— 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 
Civil No. C86-9250 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Defendants. 
-oooOooo-
The defendants David Okubo, Thoaas Nickol, and Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital's Motions for summary judgment 
having come up for hearing on December 23, 1987, and the 
court having heard additional arguments on January 5, 1988* 
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits 
in this matter, and the court having found as followsi 
1. Plaintiffs have not established through competent 
or qualified expert -testimony that defendants breached the 
requisite standard of care required of them in the treatment 
administered to the infant deceased plaintiff Tiffany Ruth 
Butterfield. 
2. The defendant Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
is not liable to plaintiffs as a matter of law inasmuch as 
the hospital employees involved in this case cannot practice 
medicine, and are not held to the standard required of the 
individual practicing physicians. 
3. In addition, the alleged misconduct on the part 
of all the respective defendants, David Okubo, Thomas Nickol 
and the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, were not a proximate 
cause of the infant plaintiff1s death inasmuch as there were 
intervening events that superceded any misconduct on the 
part of said defendants. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the motions for summary judgment of David Okubo, Thomas 
Nickol and Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital be and the same 
are hereby granted and defendants are awarded a judgment 
against plaintiffs, no cause of action, together with costs. 
DATED this Iffiday of l^E^** 4*^^T*T988 . 
IdLt 
D i s t r i c t s Corfj^/tfqftgsT 
- 2 - t H. DIXI 
OW^uty CierK 
I ON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
K ~ 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
F I L E D 
Albert John Butterfield and 
Angela Butterfield, on behalf 
of Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
David Okubo, Thomas Nickol, 
and Holy Cross Jordan Valley 
Hospital, 
Defendant and Respondents. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880347-CA 
* of m«.Court 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for the 
Butterfields 
R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake City, for Okubo 
Gary D. Stott, Salt Lake City, for Nickol 
David W. Slagle, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross Jordan 
Valley Hospital 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1 
LARSON, Judge: 
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing this action for wrongful death, which they allege to 
be due to medical malpractice by the defendants* Because of a 
lack of evidence in the record concerning proximate cause, we 
affirm. 
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989) 
The Butterfields1 infant daughter Tiffany died at home on 
December 20, 1984 of sudden infant death syndrome. She was 
born June 30, 1984. On that day and again on July 16, 1984, 
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a pediatrician. On 
two occasions in July and August 1984, the Butterfields noted 
apparent problems in Tiffany's breathing and took her to the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital ("Holy 
Cross")/ where she was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas 
Nickol, an emergency room physician and general practitioner. 
Thereafter, the Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the 
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a family 
practitioner. He examined Tiffany on five occasions in August 
through mid-December, 1984. 
Following his August 16, 1984 examination, Dr. Nickol 
recommended close observation of Tiffany*s breathing with 
attention to possible cyanosis or blue discoloration. However, 
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross referred the 
Butterfields to a physician with more extensive expertise 
specifically in infant breathing disorders. They also did not 
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring equipment. The 
record does not indicate what, if any, care or treatment was 
provided by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing problems 
during the last four months of her life. 
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued Drs. Nickol 
and Okubo and Holy Cross (but not Dr. McClellan) for medical 
malpractice, filing their complaint on December 15, 1986. On 
August 25, 1987, the district court held a scheduling 
conference, after which an order issued stating that "All 
discovery must be completed, including the filing of 
depositions!!,] by December 11, 1987." On December 11, 1987, 
the Butterfields moved to extend the discovery deadline in 
relation to Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in relation 
to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and 11, 1987, the defendants 
filed motions for summary judgment accompanied by affidavits 
stating in essence that the defendants* treatment of Tiffany 
had not fallen below the applicable standard of care and was 
not the cause of her death. The court heard those motions on 
December 23, 1987. The Butterfields had no expert testimony in 
the record in their favor until the day before the summary 
judgment hearing, when they filed an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry 
Jacobs. They attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on 
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next day. The copy 
intended for Dr. Nickolfs counsel was left with a security 
guard employed at the office building at which counsel works, 
and Dr. Okubofs counsel could not locate any served copy until 
after the summary judgment hearing. 
QQm>f7_r»E 2 
The trial court noted the apparent defects in service of 
the Jacobs affidavit, and seems to have concluded that, with or 
without the Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields had failed to 
establish a prima facie case because no competent expert 
testimony indicated either a breach of the standard of care or 
that the defendants* medical treatment proximately caused the 
child*s death. The principal2 issues presented are therefore 
(1) whether the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration 
in ruling on the motion, and (2) whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to create a factual issue about whether 
the defendants both breached the standard of care applicable to 
each and thereby proximately caused Tiffany's death. 
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit 
As courts have often noted, a party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment that is supported by affidavits and/or other 
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
. • . otherwise . . . must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him."3 in this case, therefore, the Butterfields had 
2. The Butterfields also argue that the district court should 
have granted their motion to extend the time limit for 
completion of discovery. However, we find no abuse of 
discretion in the trial court#s scheduling of the case. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
If 16.22 at 16-123 (2d ed.1989). Moreover, since the case was 
properly dismissed on summary judgment, additional time for 
discovery would serve no purpose. The Butterfields were not 
entitled to delay the summary judgment because they failed to 
proceed under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). £ss Cox v. Winters. 678 
P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geiov Pharmaceutical, 
InCt, 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Downtown Athletic 
Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 (Utah Ct. 1987). 
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Busch Corn, v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty CQ,., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); Franklin Fin, v. New 
gmpUe D<?v. COt, 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). 
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to introduce evidence supporting those elements4 of their 
case that had been effectively challenged by the defendants in 
moving for summary judgment. A major part of the Butterfields' 
evidence was the Jacobs affidavit. 
The defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit should not 
be considered because it was not properly served on their 
counsel. Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion 
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the court; 
it must also be served on opposing counsel no later than the 
day before the hearing on the motion,5 to allow them an 
opportunity to prepare for the hearing. We have previously 
noted that an affidavit that has not been properly served 
should not be considered, and the motion may be resolved 
without it. P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunoervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In this case, however, the facts relating to the lack of 
service were not suitably established. The Jacobs affidavit 
was accompanied by a certificate attesting to proper service. 
The only evidence to the contrary in the record is the unsworn 
verbal representations of counsel about the defects in service, 
representations based in part on hearsay conversations with 
their office personnel. While we have no reason to question 
the accuracy of counsels representations, the Jacobs affidavit 
was nevertheless the principal feature of the Butterfields1 
opposition to the potentially dispositive motions for summary 
judgment. The certificate of service is entitled to be taken 
at face value, unless admissible evidence shows it to be 
erroneous. The representations of counsel, though entirely 
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence, and 
therefore do not suffice to establish facts showing fatal 
deficiencies in the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We 
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in determining whether 
the Butterfields came forward with sufficient evidence to 
warrant denial of summary judgment. 
4. Briefly, to recover for medical malpractice, the plaintiff 
must show that he or she suffered an injury that was actually 
and proximately caused by an act or omission of thia medical 
professional that fell below the standard of care for that 
professionals medical field or specialty. See Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987); 
Hoopiiana v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
5. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
A 
Standard of Care 
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical 
doctor*s services/ expert medical testimony must ordinarily6 
be presented in order to establish the standard of care by 
which the doctor's conduct is to be measured and that the 
injury was proximately caused by conduct of the doctor that 
fell below that standard of care. Anderson v, Nixon. 104 Utah 
262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 
817, 821-22 (Utah App. 1988); Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338 
(Utah App- 1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc. 
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). Further, the expert 
testimony, like the standard of care which is its subject 
matter, is specific to the particular medical specialty or area 
of expertise of the defendant. In other words, one physician 
is not qualified to give an admissible opinion on the treatment 
provided by another physician, unless the physician giving the 
opinion is shown to have familiarity with the treating 
physician*s particular area of practice.7 
The expert affidavits submitted by the defendants in 
moving for summary judgment indicate both that the attesting 
expert was qualified to render an opinion on the standard of 
care applicable to the particular defendant about which he was 
speaking, and that the defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not 
fall below that standard. The question thus becomes whether 
Dr. Jacobs also indicated familiarity with the standards of 
6. An exception is made where the physician*s error is so 
plain and simple that it is within the range of ordinary lay 
knowledge. For example, in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 
1980), a surgeon left a surgical cutting needle inside the 
plaintiff's body, and the court held that expert testimony on 
the standard of care was not needed, in essence because 
everybody knows that a surgeon should not leave inside a sharp, 
foreign object used to make the incision. In this case, 
however, whether the defendants should have taken additional 
steps to prevent future apnea is a factual question not within 
the range of ordinary lay knowledge. 
7. Burton v. Younoblnnry 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see 
Siaa Cfraflwjgk, 763 P,2d at 822. 
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care applicable to the defendants sufficient to warrant 
consideration of his opinion. In that regard/ Dr. Jacobs 
stated: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State 
of Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon 
since 1974. I have past experience in 
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in 
private practice and hospitals, including 
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 
• • • • 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care# 
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics 
and emergency room medicine, as well as 
hospital responsibility for adequate record 
keeping and availability of previous records 
during later follow up care for a related 
complaint. 
Based on those statements, there is reason to question whether 
Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather eclectic background qualifies him 
as an expert in all three of the defendants1 fields of medical 
practice. However, our role is not to cross-examine the 
affidavit by conjecture;8 rather, we take it at face value, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Butterfields, since they lost the summary judgment motions in 
the court below.9 In that light, Dr. Jacobs9 representations 
of his competence are not so patently unfounded or conclusory 
that they can be wholly disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs1 
opinion concerning the standard of care contradicts those of 
the defendants* experts, it demonstrates the existence of a 
dispute of material fact, which precludes summary judgment on 
the question of the standard of care. 
Proximate Causation 
However, while Dr. Jacobs* criticizes the defendants* 
treatment of Tiffany, he does not establish the requisite 
*T SfiS EfiSYaa, 764 P.2d at 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate 
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibilityt. ]) *  
9. Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989); 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 
1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat*l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 
1987) . 
causal link between that treatment and Tiffany1s death. Dr. 
Jacobs opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe home 
monitoring of Tiffany*s breathing, and perhaps also a more 
generalized inattention to Tiffany's breathing problems, 
constitute treatment falling below the standard of care. 
However, those asserted errors occurred in mid-1984, whereas 
Tiffany died on December 19, 1984, four months after she had 
been placed in the care of another medical practitioner. The 
defendants argue that these facts, along with expert opinion, 
indicate that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately 
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores the causation 
question. 
The element of proximate causation in a tort case inquires 
into whether the defendant could, under the circumstances, 
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of which the plaintiff 
complains would result from the defendant's breach of the 
standard of care. Sfifi Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 1039 
(Utah 1987); Mitchell v, Pearson Snterst, I n c 697 p.2d 240, 
245-47 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29 
(Utah 1985). Without proof of proximate cause, the plaintiff 
cannot recover in tort. Powell Div. of Dow Chemical U.S.A. v. 
Del-Rio Drilling Programs. Inc., 761 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 
1988); Bennion Vt t*e<5rgnfl Johnson Constd Cow 701 P.2d 1078, 
1082-83 (Utah 1985). 
When proximate causation was called into question by the 
defendants in moving for summary judgment, it was incumbent on 
the Butterfields to come forward with evidence of a causal link 
between the purported malpractice and the harm for which they 
seek damages.10 However, there is nothing in the Jacobs 
affidavit to indicate that the defendants* medical treatment 
proximately caused Tiffany-s death, or even caused her death at 
all. From the record, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the defendants may have erred, but fortuitously, their error 
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause, of Tiffany's 
death.li The allegation of causation, a critical element of 
the Butterfields* prima facie case, thus remains 
unsubstantiated. 
10. flyqt v, Hurst, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1990). 
!!• Cf. Reeves. 764 P.2d at 642 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Conclusion 
We conclude that the Jacobs affidavit was before the 
court, absent evidence indicating that it was not properly 
served. That affidavit, though conclusory, nevertheless 
introduces enough apparently competent expert testimony to 
create a factual dispute on the question whether the 
defendants' treatment of Tiffany Butterfield fell below the 
applicable standards of care* However, even viewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to the Butterfields, there is a 
dearth of evidence in the record to counter the defendants' 
assertions that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately 
cause her death* 
We therefore affirm the district court's order of 
dismissal. 
IAJ&CLJ.
 n, 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Norraafa H. Jackson ,^udge 
8 
ADDENDDM C 
BY 
R. Scott Williams, #3498 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant Okubo 
Sixth Floor Boston Building Wl ~ DEPUTY CLERK 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
——oooOooo 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS W. 
NIELSON, M.D., PH.D. 
Civil No. C86-9250 
Judge Richard Moffatt 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D., being first duly sworn 
on oath deposes and states: 
1. I am a physician licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah, having a specialty in pediatric medicine. I am 
a board certified pediatrician and-am presently an assistant 
professor of pediatrics at the Department of Pediatrics at 
the University of Utah Medical Center. Of particular interest 
oooos: CiO 
to this case involving a claimed sudden infant death syndrome, 
I am board certified in pediatric pulmonology a*%d am presently 
the director of the Pediatric Pulmonary Function Laboratory 
at the University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's 
Medical Center. I am also a member of the Sudden Infant 
Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department of Health. 
A complete summary of my expertise and qualifications is 
included within the attached Curriculum Vitae to this affidavit. 
2. At the request of counsel for Dr. David Okubo, I 
have reviewed the medical records of the deceased infant, 
Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, and the depositions of Albert John 
and Angela Butterfield. 
3. That I am familiar with the standard of care required 
of a pediatrician for treatment of the symptoms as reported 
to Dr. Nickol and Dr. Okubo by the plaintiffs on July 4, 
and July 16, 1984. 
4. That after a thorough review of the medical records 
and the depositions involved in this case I am of the opinion 
that Dr. Okubo did not deviata from the standard of care 
required of him in the treatment rendered to the deceased 
infant through July 16, 1984. 
5. More specifically, even if Dr. Okubo was told by 
Mrs. Butterfield of the incident that allegedly occurred 
on July 4, 1984, and that was referred to in her deposition, 
I am still of the opinion that Dr. Okubo would not have been 
-2-
00005G 
GARY D. STOTT (A3130) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & KELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Thomas Nickol 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 S. Main St. 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA ] 
BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DAVID OKUBO, M.D., et al., 
Defendants. 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF 
1 MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D. 
1 Civil No. C86-9250 
I Judge Richard Moffatt 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF ffdUjuk- ) 
Michael C. Pinell, M.D., being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Utah, and am board certified with the American Board of 
Family Practice, Fellow American Academy of Family Practice, 
American Board of Emergency Medicine and Fellow American College of 
Emergency Physicians. 
2. My education and training are outlined in my 
Curriculum Vitae, attached as Exhibit "A". 
3. I have been involved in the practice of medicine as an 
emergency room physician in the State of Utah during the time in 
question in the Complaint of Mr. and Mrs. John Butterfield. I am 
familiar with the standard of care required of adequately-trained 
emergency medicine physicians in Salt Lake City, State of Utah 
during that time. 
4. The opinions set forth in this Affidavit are baaed on 
my review of the medical records of Tiffany Butterfield from: 
a. Dr. Kenneth 0. Hunter; 
b. Dr. David Okubo; 
c. Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital 
1) Inpatient record dated 6/4/84 and, 
2) Emergency room records dated 7/4/84 
and 8/16/84; 
d. The State Medical Examiner. 
5. Based upon my review of the medical records listed 
above, and based on my expertise as an emergency medicine physician, 
it is my opinion that the medical care rendered by Or, Thomas 
Nickol to Tiffany Butterfield on July 4, 1984 and August 16, 
1984, was performed within the accepted standard of care required of 
physicians specializing in emergency medicine. 
DATED this 3-H day Of S^yt^jy'-r , 1987. 
rv\p 
MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO/before me th,is P-V day of 
1987. 
My Commission Expires: 
BUTTERF2/R0SE 
-2-
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 1 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on : 
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH 
BUTTERFIELD, * 
Plaintiffs, : 
-vs-
DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
H. Barry Jacobs, M.D., being first duly sworn on oath 
deposes and states: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland 
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. I have past 
experience in Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in private practice and 
hospitals, including the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric 
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R. Butterfield, as well as the 
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield, and 
have met with Albert Butterfield. 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable 
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as 
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and 
availability of previous records during later follow up care for 
a related complaint. 
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of 
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided 
to Tiffany Butterfield by Dr. Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below. 
AFFIDAVIT OF H. BARRY 
JACOBS, M.D. 
tlVll NO. tB&-3^30 
Judge Richard Moffatt 
5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's 
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or 
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr. 
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was 
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis. Also omitted was 
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or 
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of 
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory 
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the 
parents, such an omission contributed directly to the failure f» 
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis. 
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric 
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made 
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained 
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to 
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need 
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility. 
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did 
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not 
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent's 
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis 
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being 
transported to the hospital that did resolve the cynosis. 
8. it is alleged that the prior emergency room record of 
07/04/84 could not be obtained. Such data* should have been 
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained 
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis 
including SIDS should have been developed. 
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on 
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge 
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and 
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician. The 
child's pa-rents insist they did not receive any follow-up 
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for 
10. There are no records available to detail what was 
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about 
10/01/84. • The parent1s deposition indicates the child again had 
an apneic episode and required stimulation. The deposition goes 
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted 
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had 
surfaced to explain the child1s problems or account for the 
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety. 
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from 
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and 
monitoring for apnea- followed by the issuance of a home apnea 
monitor, or simply arranging for a home apnea monitor. 
12. While one could perhaps argue that such care was not 
warrented following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, I am of the 
opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 pediatric 
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency room visits. 
Drs. Okubo and Nichols and a duty to insure necessary follow-up 
was carried out and failed to do so. 
13. The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an 
accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of the 
child1s demise from SIDS. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this3j_ day of December, 1987. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this • 2 ] ^ day of 
December, 1987. 
Notary Public - Residing atx 
Faye Arasim 
Reston, VA 
My Commission Expires: 
My Commission Expires May 18.1&§ 
